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INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
Amici Curiae include AARP and tenant organizations representing many thousands of public housing residents in most
jurisdictions throughout the nation. Their members, and the
communities in which they reside, are directly affected by the
eviction policies at issue here.
Amicus AARP is a nonprofit membership organization of
35 million persons age fifty and older dedicated to addressing
the needs and interests of older Americans. Over 1.7 million
households, headed by a person 62 years of age and older,
live in federally subsidized rental housing. AARP’s interest
in housing extends to the rights of those older residents, including those who are raising their grandchildren, some of
whom reside in public housing covered by the eviction policies at issue in this case.
Additional Amici are tenant organizations representing
public housing residents in communities around the nation.
Each of these tenant organizations has an interest in ensuring
that this Court maintain and enforce clear and long-standing
congressional policies that protect innocent, law-abiding tenants from unjust evictions.
Amicus ENPHRONT—Everywhere and Now Public
Housing Residents Organizing Nationally Together—is a
resident-led organization with members and affiliates in 46
states, in addition to Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, that advocates for the preservation, improvement and
development of public housing through coordinated local and
1

Amici Curiae have obtained the written consent of Petitioners United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Oakland
Housing Authority (OHA), and Harold Davis, as well as the written consent of Respondents Pearlie Rucker, et al. to file this brief with the Court.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37(6), Amici Curiae note that counsel
for Amici wrote the entirety of this brief and that no person or entity,
other than the Amici Curiae, their members, or their counsel, made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
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national action. The organization also works to educate residents about the laws and policies affecting their lives, including those governing evictions.
Amicus Massachusetts Union of Public Housing Tenants
(Mass Union), a membership organization including individual residents and local tenant organizations, represents thousands of tenants statewide. It seeks to advance safe and secure public housing through responsible behavior by both
tenants and housing authorities. Mass Union believes that
while housing authorities should act vigilantly to protect
families from crime and violence through eviction of tenants
that do not live responsibly, residents should not have to fear
that their entire families will become homeless as the result
of one bad act which the head of household had no reason to
anticipate, and innocent tenants should keep their homes if
they take reasonable steps to exclude wrongdoers.
Amicus Island Tenants on the Rise is a Hawai’i statewide
nonprofit organization of elected public housing tenants from
five islands. Formed in 1996, it represents the interests of
over 2000 families. It provides training and counseling to
residents with respect to evictions and issues related to crime,
security, and maintenance in their homes, and advocates for
its members with respect to the policies of the state housing
authority.
Amicus Public Housing Resident Council (PHRC) is the
city-wide organization of all public housing tenant leaders in
Kansas City, Missouri. Its membership consists of 55 elected
officers of the various public housing developments, representing over 1,800 public housing families and households.
Established in 1994, it is recognized by the Housing Authority of Kansas City (HAKC) as the Resident Advisory Board
and as the city-wide organization of resident leaders. The
PHRC negotiated a lease with the HAKC, which includes
protection for innocent tenants, which, in conjunction with
other crime and security measures, has proven effective in
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reducing crime in HAKC public housing communities, while
protecting tenants against arbitrary loss of their homes.
Amicus Carmelitos Tenants Association, in existence for
more than 25 years and incorporated in 1994, is the recognized representative of the more than 500 residents of the
Carmelitos housing development in Long Beach, California.
It publishes a monthly newsletter to inform and educate its
members, has negotiated and commented on revisions to
leases, represents tenants in grievances, and counsels tenants
on eviction-related issues.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 1437d(l)(6) of the United States Housing Act provides that Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) that receive
federal assistance shall use leases that “provide that any . . .
drug-related criminal activity on or off [public housing]
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member
of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under
the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (Supp. V 1999).
HUD has interpreted this section to require PHAs to use
leases that contain provisions obligating a public housing
tenant
[t]o assure that the tenant, any member of the
household, a guest, or another person under the
tenant’s control, shall not engage in . . . [a]ny
drug-related criminal activity on or near [public
housing] premises. Any criminal activity in violation of the preceding sentence shall be cause for
termination of tenancy, and for eviction from the
unit.
24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12)(i)(B) (2000). In promulgating this
regulation, HUD explained that it understood section
1437d(l)(6) as requiring that PHAs use leases imposing upon
public housing tenants the obligation to warrant against illicit
drug activity. Public Housing Lease and Grievance Proce-
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dures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560, 51,567 (Oct. 11, 1991) (“The
tenant should not be excused from contractual responsibility
by arguing that the tenant did not know, could not foresee, or
could not control behavior by other occupants of the unit.”).
While Amici fully support Respondents’ argument that
Congress intended to create, as a matter of federal law, an
innocent tenant2 defense to eviction under the lease provision
required by section 1437d(l)(6), Amici here argue in the alternative that the text of section 1437d(l)(6) is silent as to the
existence of affirmative defenses and that HUD’s interpretation of the section, precluding an innocent-tenant defense, is
an unreasonable construction of the statute. See Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”); id. at 844 (noting that where a “legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is
implicit rather than explicit” the question for the court is
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable).3
2

Throughout this brief, Amici will use the term “innocent tenant” to
mean a public housing tenant who did not know, and had no reason to
know, of the drug-related criminal activity that is the basis for a PHA’s
eviction action against the tenant.
3

Petitioners OHA and Davis imply that HUD interpreted section
1437d(l)(6) pursuant to express congressional delegation and that, therefore, HUD’s regulations should be given “‘controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’” OHA
Brief 26 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44). OHA’s implication is
mistaken: Congress did not expressly delegate authority to HUD to
promulgate legislative regulations to give effect to section 1437d(l)(6).
Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(q)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“The Secretary
shall, by regulation, establish procedures necessary to ensure that information provided under this subsection to a public housing agency is used.
. . as required under this subsection.”). HUD’s authority to interpret section 1437d(l)(6) arises under Congress’ grant of general rule-making
power, as HUD itself notes. See 24 C.F.R. pt. 966 (2000) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 3535(d) (1994)). Thus the inquiry for the Court is whether

6
Section 1437d(l)(6) indisputably requires PHAs to use
leases that create a cause for termination of tenancy. But under basic principles of landlord-tenant law, the existence of a
cause for termination is not incompatible with the existence
of affirmative defenses to eviction. Federally assisted public
housing is an amalgam of state and federal law, and the existence of federal protections against eviction do not preempt
protections available under state law, as HUD has expressly
acknowledged. Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560, 51,565 (Oct. 11, 1991). The text
of section 1437d(l)(6) is silent as to the existence of any affirmative defenses. Congress enacted section 1437d(l)(6)
against a backdrop of landlord-tenant law under which affirmative defenses may be asserted in response to a cause for
termination. Thus, the text’s silence regarding affirmative
defenses cannot be taken as an indication of congressional
intent to preclude an innocent-tenant defense.
HUD’s interpretation of Congress’ silence is unreasonable.
1. HUD has previously tried to curtail tenants’ rights to
present legal and equitable defenses to eviction. When it did
so, Congress interceded and asked HUD to reconsider. Petitioners argue that because there is no express language in
section 1437d(l)(6) creating an innocent-tenant defense, the
Court should conclude that Congress did not intend to permit
one. In light of this history, however, the opposite presumption should hold. Absent clear statutory language that eliminates defenses, the Court should conclude that section
1437d(l)(6) leaves in place any affirmative defenses to eviction that exist under state or federal law.
2. Congress requires PHAs to use leases that do not contain any unreasonable terms or conditions. 42 U.S.C.
HUD’s regulations implementing section 1437d(l)(6) are reasonable.
United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S.Ct. 2164, 2172 (2001); Chevron, 467
U.S. at 844.
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§ 1437d(l)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). HUD argues that this
requirement has no bearing on the proper interpretation of
section 1437d(l)(6) because, by enacting the section, Congress has decided that the exclusion of an innocent-tenant
defense is reasonable. But this argument begs the question,
for it assumes that the section precludes an innocent-tenant
defense. The proper question is whether Congress’ prohibition against unreasonable terms suggests anything about
whether, in enacting section 1437d(l)(6), Congress intended
to prohibit the innocent-tenant defense. If there are reasons
for believing that the exclusion of such a defense would be
unreasonable, then the prohibition against unreasonable terms
suggests that section 1437d(l)(6) should not be interpreted as
prohibiting the defense.
There are at least two reasons for believing that the exclusion of an innocent-tenant defense would be unreasonable.
The first is that it undermines the central policy goal it purports to further. HUD argues that strict liability gives public
housing tenants an incentive to determine whether their
household members or guests are engaging in drug-related
activity and to prevent such activity from occurring. However, the preclusion of an innocent tenant defense almost ensures that tenants will not seek the assistance of public housing authorities or the police to address the illicit behavior because such a request could easily result in the tenant’s eviction.
Second, the preclusion of an innocent tenant defense is inconsistent with Congress’ endorsement of the good cause
eviction requirement in public housing. The good cause requirement was first recognized by the courts in the 1950s,
was developed by HUD in the 1960s and 1970s, and was endorsed by Congress and made part of the Housing Act in
1983. Underlying the good cause requirement is the idea
that, because of the importance of the benefit involved, a
public housing tenant should not be deprived of his or her
home in the absence of serious misconduct for which the ten-
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ant can fairly be held responsible. Permitting the eviction of
innocent tenants is inconsistent with this long-standing principle and so is unreasonable.
3. There is little extant legislative history that is relevant
to the question of an innocent tenant defense. Most of the
history on which Petitioners and their Amici Curiae rely does
not speak to the issue of whether a tenant, faced with possible
eviction for alleged breach of the lease provision mandated
by section 1437d(l)(6), may assert any affirmative defenses.
The one piece of legislative history that directly bears on the
questions presented supports the conclusion that, in enacting
section 1437d(l)(6), Congress not only did not intend to preclude affirmative defenses but intended to protect innocent
tenants. The Senate committee report accompanying legislation amending section 1437d(l)(6) states that the section does
not create good cause to evict innocent family members. The
report also explicitly states that eviction courts are to exercise
discretion in considering whether to evict under the required
lease provision. This is weighty evidence that Congress believed that a tenant could present affirmative defenses, including innocence, to the eviction court. If the section precluded defenses, the only issue for the eviction court to decide would be the existence of a cause for termination, and
the court would have no occasion to exercise its discretion.
4. When a statute is silent about some issue, deference to
agency regulations is appropriate when the agency’s regulations apply the statute’s general policies to specific circumstances that Congress may not have considered. This is not a
case in which Congress expected HUD to fill a statutory gap.
A public housing tenancy is an amalgam of federal and state
law. The distinction between causes for eviction and affirmative defenses is basic to state landlord-tenant law.
Moreover, public housing tenants routinely assert state-law
defenses in eviction proceedings. In enacting section
1437d(l)(6), Congress was well aware of the hybrid nature of
the public housing leasehold interest and the use of state-law
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defenses to eviction. Through section 1437d(l)(6), Congress
required PHAs to use leases that create a specific cause for
termination. The availability of affirmative defenses to eviction is a central element of the public housing tenancy. Had
Congress intended to eliminate affirmative defenses, one
would expect Congress to have done so explicitly. Congress’
silence on the availability of affirmative defenses is an indication of its intent not to disrupt the status quo.
ARGUMENT
THE TEXT OF SECTION 1437d(l)(6) IS SILENT AS TO
THE EXISTENCE OF AN INNOCENT TENANT DEFENSE; HUD’S INTERPRETATION OF THE SECTION IS UNREASONABLE AND THEREFORE INVALID
I.

THE TEXT OF SECTION 1437d(l)(6) IS SILENT
AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN INNOCENT
TENANT DEFENSE

Under Petitioners’ interpretation of the plain language of
section 1437d(l)(6), Congress requires PHAs to use leases
that permit them to terminate the tenancy of a public housing
tenant and evict the tenant if a member of the tenant’s household, a guest, or other person under the tenant’s control engages in specified drug-related activity, regardless of whether
the tenant knew, or had reason to know, about the drugrelated activity. See, e.g., Brief for the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD Brief)
14, 18; Brief for Petitioners Oakland Housing Authority and
Harold Davis (OHA Brief) 17–18, 28.
Petitioners primarily base their interpretation on two
premises. The first is what HUD describes as the “expansive” language used in section 1437d(l)(6): The provision
makes “any” drug-related criminal activity a ground for termination. HUD Brief 20; see also id. at 23; OHA Brief 27.
The second is that the section contains no express language
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limiting the required lease provision to drug-related activity
of which the tenant was, or should have been, aware. HUD
Brief 19; OHA Brief 29. From these premises, Petitioners
conclude that Congress intended to permit PHAs to hold tenants strictly liable for the conduct of their household members, guests, and others over whom they have control. HUD
Brief 20; OHA Brief 29.
As Amici will demonstrate, Petitioners’ conclusion is
simply a non sequitur. From the fact that the section unambiguously requires PHAs to use leases that create an unqualified cause for termination, it does not follow that the section
prohibits affirmative defenses to the cause. The section is
silent as to the existence of such defenses.
As HUD correctly notes, “‘[t]he plainness or ambiguity of
statutory language is determined by reference to the language
itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and
the broader context of the statute as a whole.’” HUD Brief
18 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341
(1997)). HUD concedes that section 1437d(l)(6) “does not
expressly address the tenant’s level of personal knowledge, in
the sense that it does not expressly condition eviction on any
state of personal knowledge.” Id. at 23. HUD nonetheless
concludes that the section’s use of “any” and the absence of
express defenses precludes an innocent-tenant defense.
HUD’s argument ignores “the specific context in which
the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as
a whole.” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341. When basic elements
of typical state landlord-tenant law are considered—elements
upon which Congress has relied since it created federallyassisted public housing in 19374—it becomes apparent that
the fact that section 1437d(l)(6) provides a ground for termi4

The 1937 act recognized state “civil and criminal jurisdiction in and
over” federally owned public housing projects and explicitly preserved
“the civil rights under the State or local law of the inhabitants on such
property.” United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412,
§ 13(b), 50 Stat. 888, 895.
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nation does not preclude the existence of affirmative defenses
to that ground.
HUD has long recognized that a public housing tenancy is
defined, in part, by state landlord-tenant law. See, e.g., Tenancy and Administrative Grievance Procedure for Public
Housing, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,216, 33,257 (Aug. 30, 1988)
(“[T]he procedural and substantive law affecting a tenancy in
the public housing program is compounded of elements established by both Federal and State law.”). In announcing its
final rule concerning eviction for drug-related activity following the passage of the Cranston-Gonzales National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079
(1990), HUD emphasized that a public housing tenancy
should be understood as a creature of “normal landlordtenant law.” Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,567.
It is a basic principle of “normal landlord-tenant law” that
the existence of a statutory or contractual cause for termination of a tenancy is not incompatible with the existence of
affirmative defenses to termination on that ground. Thus, for
example, in most if not all states, nonpayment of rent is a
ground for eviction.5 However, in most states, a tenant may
raise the landlord’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability as an affirmative defense to eviction for nonpayment of
rent.6 The defense is available notwithstanding the fact that
5

See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1161(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 2001);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 105.115 (1999); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. ch. 24 (Vernon
2000).
6

By 1979, the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability had obtained
majority status in the United States, having been adopted by 41 states and
the District of Columbia. See Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 902 & n.2
(Pa. 1979) (collecting cases and statutes). Most courts to have considered
the issue have held that breach of the implied warranty of habitability is
an affirmative defense to eviction for nonpayment of rent. See Robert S.
Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant § 3:22 n.4 (1980 &
Supp. 2001) (collecting cases); see also Restatement (Second) of Prop.:
Landlord and Tenant § 5.1 n.7a (1977 & Supp. 2001) (collecting cases).
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the statutes making nonpayment of rent a ground for eviction
typically do not explicitly provide for affirmative defenses.7
Similarly, many courts have refused to evict when they found
that the tenants should not be held responsible for the offending conduct.8 Moreover, many states have recognized an innocent-tenant defense to for-cause evictions.9
7

For a discussion of the common law development of the implied warranty of habitability, see Schoshinski, supra note 6, § 3:16. Some states
have created the implied warranty by statute, id. § 3:31, and many have
recognized assertion of the implied warranty as an affirmative defense to
eviction, id. § 3:32 n.83.

8

See, e.g., Brown v. Hous. Opportunities Comm'n, 714 A.2d 197 (Md.
1998) (upholding authority of trial court to refuse to evict tenant for demonstrated breach of lease involving off-premises fight and drug possession of household member); Hodess v. Bonefont, 519 N.E.2d 258 (Mass.
1988) (holding that thefts committed by sons not sufficient reason to evict
tenant), Investors Diversified Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Brown, No. 87-360-II,
1988 WL 102781 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1988) (holding that single, unforeseeable assault by child on playmate not sufficient for eviction of
tenant); Moundsville Hous. Auth. v. Porter, 370 S.E.2d 341 (W.Va. 1988)
(holding that beating of tenant by boyfriend was not sufficient reason to
evict).

9

See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-15 (1991); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121B,
§ 32 (Supp. 2001); Hous. Auth. of Norwalk v. Harris, 625 A.2d 816
(Conn. 1993); Williams v. Hawai’i Hous. Auth., 690 P.2d 285 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1984); Am. Apt. Mgmt. Co. v. Phillips, 653 N.E.2d 834 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Bell, 697 N.E.2d 130 (Mass. 1998) (reaffirming Spence v. Gormley, 439 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1982)); Charlotte
Hous. Auth. v. Patterson, 464 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); Hous.
Auth. v. Thomas, 723 A.2d 119 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1999); Allegheny
County Hous. Auth. v. Hibbler, 748 A.2d 786 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000);
Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson, 38 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. 2001), cert.
denied, 122 S.Ct. 59 (2001), Wessington House Apts. v. Clinard, No. M
1999-01029-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 605105 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 5,
2001); cf. 7 C.F.R. pt. 1930, subpt. C, Ex. B ¶ XIV(A)(2)(c) (2000) (Rural Housing Service (RHS) regulation providing that, for RHSadministered housing, drug-related grounds for eviction do not extend to
uninvolved household members, or to cases in which tenant takes reasonable steps to prevent or control or remove the offender). For a discussion
of various states’ experiences with drug-eviction policies and the inno-
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It is indisputable that section 1437d(l)(6) requires PHAs to
use leases that make the commission of certain criminal and
drug-related activity a cause for termination of tenancy. But
Petitioners are mistaken in arguing that the creation of a
broad cause for termination and the absence of any express
language creating an affirmative innocent-tenant defense
demonstrates that Congress intended to impose a lease provision requiring the tenant to warrant that no drug-related activity will occur on or off public housing premises, regardless of
the tenant’s knowledge. See HUD Brief 23; OHA Brief 29.
While section 1437d(l)(6) requires PHAs to use leases that
contain a certain cause for termination of tenancy, the statute
is silent as to the existence of any affirmative defenses to that
cause.10

cent-tenant defense see David B. Bryson & Roberta L. Youmans, Crime,
Drugs, and Subsidized Housing, 24 Clearinghouse Rev. 435 (1990); Diana A. Johnston, Drugs and Public Housing: A Connecticut Case Study,
24 Clearinghouse Rev. 448 (1990).
10

HUD argues that Congress’ subsequent passage of the Quality Housing
and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (Quality Housing Act), Pub. L. No.
105-276, § 577, 112 Stat. 2639, 2640–41 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 13662(a) (Supp. V 1999)), provides additional evidence that, in enacting section 1437d(l)(6), Congress intended to preclude an innocent tenant
defense. See HUD Brief 21 n.7, 42 n.16. That section of the Quality
Housing Act requires PHAs or owners of federally assisted housing to
establish standards or use leases with provisions that “allow the agency or
owner . . . to terminate the tenancy or assistance for any household with a
member . . . who the public housing agency or owner determines is illegally using a controlled substance.” 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a). However the
Quality Housing Act provision provides no support for HUD’s position.
Like section 1437d(l)(6), section 13662(a) creates a cause for termination
without explicitly creating or prohibiting affirmative defenses to the
cause. As demonstrated in the text, under typical landlord-tenant law, the
existence of a cause for termination of tenancy is not in itself evidence of
the absence of any affirmative defenses to termination on that ground.
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II. HUD’S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 1437d(l)(6)
IS UNREASONABLE
A. HUD previously attempted to eliminate public
housing tenants’ legal and equitable defenses to
eviction and was rebuffed by Congress; the Court
should not assume that Congress has implicitly
eliminated a defense to eviction
Generally, when a PHA decides to terminate a tenant’s
lease, the tenant first has a right to contest the PHA’s decision at an administrative grievance proceeding before defending against the eviction in court. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) (1994
& Supp. V 1999) (directing HUD to promulgate regulations
that require PHAs to provide administrative grievance procedures through which a tenant affected by an adverse PHA
action may contest the PHA’s determination that such action
is merited); see 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.51(a)(1), 966.53(a) (2000)
(implementing section 1437d(k)). If the eviction is based on
the occurrence of drug-related criminal activity, Congress
permits PHAs to bypass grievance proceedings so long as the
state in which the PHA is located requires a judicial hearing
prior to eviction and such court hearings “provide the basic
elements of due process.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k); see 24
C.F.R. § 966.51(a)(2) (2000).
Congress requires HUD to make the determination
whether state-court eviction proceedings satisfy due process.
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k). Since 1975, HUD has defined the
“elements of due process” to include the “[o]pportunity for
the tenant . . . to present any affirmative legal or equitable
defense which the tenant may have.”
24 C.F.R.
§ 966.53(c)(3) (2000); see Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 40 Fed. Reg. 33,402, 33,407 (Aug. 7,
1975).
In 1988, HUD published a final rule which would have
eliminated, among other things, the opportunity to present
legal and equitable defenses as an element of due process.
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Tenancy and Administrative Grievance Procedure for Public
Housing, 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,290–33,293, 33,304 (announcing, inter alia, adoption of proposed 24 C.F.R. § 966.2).
Shortly thereafter, a congressional conference committee report on legislation to amend the McKinney Act specifically
questioned the adequacy of the criteria HUD planned to use
in making its due process determinations. H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 100-1089, at 102 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4395, 4486. When it enacted the legislation recommended
by the conference report, Congress directed HUD to treat the
regulations announced in its final rule as having only interim
effect and to entertain additional public comments on the
rules. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendment Acts of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-628, § 1013, 102 Stat.
3224, 3269 (1988). Subsequently, a federal court enjoined
implementation of the regulations, Nat’l Tenants Org. v.
Pierce, No. 88-3134, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18348, *9
(D.D.C. Jan. 25, 1989), and HUD withdrew the proposed
regulations, reinstating the prior regulations, which contained
the right to present legal and equitable defenses as an element
of due process, Tenancy and Administrative Grievance Procedure for Public Housing, 54 Fed. Reg. 6,886 (Feb. 15,
1989).
When it next proposed changes to public housing grievance procedures, HUD retained the opportunity to present
legal and equitable defenses as an element of due process.
Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed.
Reg. 6,248, 6,252 (Feb. 14, 1991). As HUD explained, this
requirement “signifies that the tenant must be able to raise in
the proceeding any defense which would defeat the landlord’s eviction claim for possession as a matter of substantive
law.” Id. When HUD promulgated the final regulations, it
announced that, with an exception not relevant here, it had
adopted “verbatim” the definition of due process elements
contained in the original 1975 regulations. Public Housing
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Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560,
51,573 (Oct. 11, 1991).
When HUD attempted to limit tenants’ grievance rights
and, in establishing criteria for finding that state judicial eviction procedures satisfy due process, sought to eliminate the
requirement that tenants have the right to present legal and
equitable defenses, Congress stepped in and asked HUD to
reconsider. Petitioners suggest that, because there is no express language in the statute creating an innocent-tenant defense, the Court should conclude that none exists. HUD
Brief 19, OHA Brief 29. In light of HUD’s previous attempt
to eliminate tenants’ defenses and Congress’ intercession,
Petitioners reverse the burden. The Court should not construe section 1437d(l)(6) as eliminating a tenant’s defense to
eviction absent clear statutory language expressly doing so.
B. Interpreting section 1437d(l)(6) as precluding an
innocent-tenant defense is unreasonable in light of
the prohibition in section 1437d(l)(2) of lease provisions that contain unreasonable terms and conditions
In considering whether HUD’s preclusion of an innocenttenant defense squares with congressional intent, the Ninth
Circuit construed section 1437d(l)(6) in light of section
1437d(l)(2), which requires PHAs to use leases that do not
contain unreasonable terms and conditions. Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari in No. 00-1770 (Pet. App.) 13a–
14a. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the eviction of innocent tenants would not further the policy objectives HUD
identified and would lead to irrational results. For that reason, the court decided that a lease provision that prohibited
an innocent tenant defense would be unreasonable. Pet. App.
14a–15a. Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded, interpreting
section 1437d(l)(6) to prohibit an innocent-tenant defense
would be to construe the section as requiring PHAs to use
leases that contain an unreasonable term, in conflict with the
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prohibition against such terms in section 1437d(l)(2). Id. In
order to read the sections harmoniously, the court construed
section 1437d(l)(6) as permitting an innocent-tenant defense.
Id.
HUD argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in interpreting
section 1437d(l)(6) in light of section 1437d(l)(2)’s prohibition against unreasonable lease terms or conditions. HUD
Brief 15 (“Congress’s decision in Section 1437d(l)(6) to require inclusion of a lease term authorizing eviction of a tenant for a household member’s drug-related criminal activity
necessarily shows that Congress decided that such a term is
not unreasonable . . . .”). But HUD begs the question, for it
assumes what is to be proven, namely, whether section
1437d(l)(6) precludes an innocent-tenant defense.
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretive methodology is sound.
This Court has only recently explained that
[i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in
their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme. A court must therefore
interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme and fit, if possible, all
parts into an harmonious whole.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
133 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
If there are independent reasons for believing that the elimination of an innocent-tenant defense would be unreasonable,
then section 1437d(l)(6) should be interpreted as requiring
the recognition of, or at least not precluding, that defense.
There are, indeed, reasons for believing that precluding an
innocent-tenant defense would be unreasonable. First,
HUD’s interpretation of section 1437d(l)(6) undermines the
central policy goal it purports to further. As HUD recognizes, Congress enacted section 1437d(l)(6) as a means to
combat the use and sale of illegal drugs in public housing and
the violence and other criminal behavior associated with the
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drug problem. HUD Brief 3–4 (quoting policy provisions of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 5122, 102 Stat. 4181, 4301). HUD argues that the imposition of strict liability on public housing tenants creates “the
maximum incentive [for tenants] to find out whether household members or guests are engaging in drug-related criminal
activity, to warn them of the serious consequences of their
activity, and to take whatever other steps are necessary to
protect the security of the housing project.” HUD Brief 35;
see also, e.g., Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,563.
It is a matter of common sense that, without assistance
from the authorities, a tenant who discovers that a household
member or guest is engaging in illegal drug-related activity
will often not be able to prevent the individual from subsequently engaging in that behavior or permanently to remove
the individual from the lease or from public housing property.11 See Restriction on Representation in Certain Eviction
Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63,757 (Dec. 2, 1996)
(“[I]nnocent family members often need legal protection
from the drug abuser.”) (explaining final rules of the Legal
11

This is especially true of the large population of public housing tenants
who are elderly or have disabilities. In 1998, 36% of public housing tenants were 62 years of age or more. HUD, A Picture of Subsidized
Households (1998), http://www.huduser.org/datasets/assthsg/statedata98/
descript.html. In 1998, over a third of public housing tenants over 62 had
disabilities, as did one-fifth of those under 62. Id. Congress is acutely
aware that elderly Americans are especially vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3027(a)(15)(E), 3030d(a)(15), 3058i
(1994) (providing for federal funding for and assistance in creating state
elder protective services); S. Rep. No. 98-467 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 2989 (noting the “growing evidence of significant
levels of elder abuse in this country”) (report on proposed amendments to
the Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3058ee (1994)). It
is difficult to believe that Congress intended to permit the eviction of elderly public housing tenants who have been exploited by household members or guests, especially where the tenants knew nothing of the household member or guest’s illicit activity.
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Services Corporation). But since it would permit eviction
whether the tenant knew or had reason to know of the illicit
activity, HUD’s interpretation of section 1437d(l)(6) gives
tenants a disincentive to report serious drug problems to public housing authorities or the police.12 Because tenants will
know that if they seek the assistance of the authorities they
will be subject to eviction, tenants will be less likely to take
the “other steps [that] are necessary to protect the security of
the housing project.” HUD Brief 35; see Nelson H. Mock,
Note, Punishing the Innocent: No-Fault Eviction of Public
Housing Tenants for the Actions of Third Parties, 76 Tex. L.
Rev. 1495, 1516–17 (1998). HUD’s interpretation thus
squarely conflicts with the central purpose underlying section
1437d(l)(6).13
12

Indeed, HUD took the position before the Ninth Circuit that section
1437d(l)(6) permits the eviction of tenants who did everything possible to
prevent the illicit activity. See, e.g., Pet. App. 22a.
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HUD also argues that strict-liability is required in order to give PHAs
“bargaining power” over tenants that is necessary to get them to agree to
bar the individual engaged in drug-related criminal activity. HUD Brief
36. The idea that PHAs need strict liability in order to have bargaining
power over tenants resembles the notion that one needs a hand grenade to
kill a fly. The vast majority of tenants evicted from public housing cannot afford housing in the private market. The median income of public
housing tenants in 1999 was $7,631. HUD, Recent Research Results,
New Facts About Households Assisted by HUD’s Housing Programs
(October 2000), http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/rrr/rrr_10_2000/1000
_6.html. That makes for a median monthly income of $636. The median
national rent for a two-bedroom apartment in 1999 was $596. United
States Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, American Housing
Survey for the United States: 1999, at 226 (October 2000), available at
http://www.huduser.org/datasets/ahs/ahs_1999.pdf. Even if an innocenttenant defense is available, public housing tenants must establish the factual basis for this defense in order to avoid eviction. This is no easy task,
especially for the many public housing tenants who are unrepresented in
eviction proceedings. Moreover, courts in jurisdictions that recognize an
innocent-tenant defense do not hesitate to evict when the tenant fails to
convince the court that he or she reasonably lacked knowledge of the illicit activity that was the cause for termination. See, e.g., Williams v.
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Second, HUD’s interpretation of section 1437d(l)(6) as
prohibiting an innocent-tenant defense is inconsistent with
Congress’ endorsement of the good cause eviction requirements in public housing that were first developed in the
courts and later codified by HUD and Congress. Congress
has itself for nearly two decades required PHAs to use leases
that provide “that the public housing agency may not terminate the tenancy except for serious or repeated violation of
the terms or conditions of the lease or for other good cause.”
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
The good cause standard evolved first as a matter of case
law. During the McCarthy Era, a number of PHAs required
tenants to sign loyalty oaths as a condition of their continued
tenancy. When tenants refused to sign, the PHAs attempted
to evict them. A number of courts held that the tenants’ refusal was not good cause to evict, because eviction on that
ground had no rational relationship to the purposes of public
housing. See, e.g., Hous. Auth. v. Cordova, 279 P.2d 215
(Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1955); Chicago Hous. Auth. v.
Blackman, 122 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. 1954).
In the mid-1960s, HUD began administrative implementation of the good cause standard. HUD first urged and then
required PHAs to provide tenants with the reasons for the
proposed termination of their leases. Thorpe v. Hous. Auth.
of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 272–63 & n.8, 275 (1969) (discussing HUD circulars). Thereafter, it limited the sorts of
reasons PHAs could give to terminate tenancies, forbidding
PHAs to evict tenants except for “violation of the terms of
the lease or other good cause.” HUD, Consolidated Annual

Hawai’i Hous. Auth., 690 P.2d 285 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984); Spence v.
Gormley, 439 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1982); Romero v. Martinez, 721 N.Y.S.
2d 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). Thus, the simple threat of eviction—and
the likely homelessness or substandard housing that would result—gives
PHAs substantial bargaining power over tenants, even if they have recourse to an innocent-tenant defense.
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Contributions Contract, Part II, HUD Form No. 53011,
§ 203(B) (Nov. 1969). HUD then included the good cause
requirement when it promulgated its first regulations on PHA
leases and grievance procedures. Lease and Grievance Procedures, 40 Fed. Reg. at 33,405. In 1983, Congress incorporated the good cause requirement into the Housing Act.
Housing and Urban Renewal Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L.
No. 98-181 § 204, 97 Stat. 1155, 1179 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
The good cause doctrine is built upon the principle that,
because of the importance of the benefit, a public or federally
subsidized housing tenant should not be deprived of his or
her home in the absence of serious misconduct for which he
or she is responsible. See, e.g., Maxton Hous. Auth. v.
McLean, 328 S.E.2d 290 (N.C. 1985); Messiah Baptist Hous.
Dev. Fund Co. v. Rosser, 400 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y.City Ct.
1977); Moundsville Hous. Auth. v. Porter, 370 S.E.2d 341
(W.Va. 1988). Permitting the eviction of persons who bear
no culpability for the illicit activity that is the basis for the
eviction action is flatly inconsistent with this principle. It is a
“basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.” Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972). Evicting innocent tenants offends that basic concept
and so is unreasonable. In any case, had Congress intended
to erode what is now a cornerstone of the public housing tenancy, it would not have done so by implication.
C. The legislative history of section 1437d(l)(6)
evinces Congress’ intent to permit tenants to assert
an innocent-tenant defense during judicial eviction
proceedings
There is little legislative history directly relevant to the
questions presented in this case. What exists supports the
conclusion that Congress did not intend to foreclose tenants’
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ability to present an innocent-tenant defense at a judicial
eviction hearing.
1. The predecessor to what is now section 1437d(l)(6) was
originally enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, § 5101, 102 Stat. at 4300. There exists no conference
committee report for this act.
The sole contemporaneous legislative history concerning
the provision making drug-related criminal activity a cause
for termination are the two sentences that appear in each of
the Senate and House sponsor’s section-by-section description. Both sponsors simply paraphrase the statutory text of
section 1437d(l)(6). 134 Cong. Rec. 32,692, 33,148, 33,149,
33,186 (1988). HUD notes the Senate sponsor’s statement
that the statutory provision “‘codifies current HUD guidelines granting public housing agencies authority to evict tenants if they, their families, or their guests engage in drugrelated criminal activity.’” HUD Brief 38 (quoting 134
Cong. Rec. at 33,186) (alteration omitted). HUD suggests
that the regulations to which the Senate sponsor referred were
those promulgated by HUD on August 30, 1988, id. at 38,
and that Congress “specifically adopted the approach of the
HUD regulations,” id. at 38–39.14
The regulation in question required PHAs to use leases
that provide that the tenant “[s]hall not engage in criminal
activity in the dwelling unit or premises, and shall prevent
14

HUD notes the regulations promulgated on August 30, 1988 were subject to a temporary restraining order, that Congress directed HUD to treat
the regulations as interim rather than final and to reopen notice and comment, that the court that issued the restraining order thereafter preliminarily enjoined implementation of the regulations, and that HUD ultimately
withdrew the regulations. HUD Brief at 39 n.13. But HUD fails to mention that the congressional conference committee report for the legislation
that directed HUD to reconsider the regulations expressed serious reservations about HUD’s elimination from among the “elements of due process” the opportunity to present legal and equitable defenses—such as
breach of the warranty of habitability—during judicial eviction hearings.
See supra Part II.A.
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criminal activity in the unit or premises by guests, visitors, or
other persons under control of Household members.” Tenancy and Administrative Grievance Procedure for Public
Housing, 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,227. While HUD would like the
Court to infer that the regulation, and the predecessor to section 1437d(l)(6), unequivocally permitted the eviction of tenants who did not know and had no reason to know of the
drug-related criminal activity, this is not how HUD understood its regulation in 1988. HUD explained that under the
lease provision required by the regulation “[t]he tenant has a
positive duty to ‘prevent’ the prohibited activities by third
parties. The tenant does not escape responsibility if the tenant
and household passively condone prohibited acts. Instead, the
tenant and household must do what is necessary to ‘prevent’
the prohibited acts.” Id. at 33,229 (emphasis added).
At the very most, HUD’s explanation of its regulation
simply does not speak to the question of whether eviction is
permitted under the regulation when the tenant did not know
and had no reason to know of the prohibited activity. However, HUD’s explanation of the purpose of the regulation—
that it is meant to prevent a tenant from escaping responsibility if he or she passively condones illicit activity—
demonstrates that in 1988 HUD believed that the regulation
only applied to tenants who knew of the illicit activity.
2. Amici Council of Large Public Housing Authorities et
al. argue that the 1989 enactment and subsequent repeal of a
statutory provision protecting the rights of tenants “not involved” in drug-related activity is further evidence that, in
enacting the predecessor to section 1437d(l)(6), Congress
intended to prohibit the assertion of an innocent-tenant defense. Brief for Amici Council of Large Public Housing Authorities et al. (CLPHA Brief) 12–14.
As discussed above, if a PHA decides to evict a tenant for
drug-related criminal activity, the PHA may bypass the administrative grievance process if the PHA is located in a jurisdiction in which HUD finds that judicial eviction proce-
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dures satisfy the elements of due process. See supra Part
II.A. The statute the CLPHA brief discusses directed HUD
not to authorize a waiver of administrative grievance procedures in cases involving eviction for drug-related criminal
activity unless the jurisdiction seeking waiver, in addition to
satisfying HUD’s due process standard, ensured that the eviction of a household member involved in drug-related activity
did not “‘affect the right of any other household member who
is not involved in such activity to continue tenancy.’”
CLPHA Brief 13 n.23 (quoting Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers, Urgent Supplementals, and
Correcting Enrollment Errors Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 10145, § 404(b), 103 Stat. 97, 128).
The CLPHA brief suggests that the subsequent repeal of
this provision evinces Congress’ intent to preclude an innocent-tenant defense.15 However, as the District Court in this
case concluded, the statutory provision that was repealed
simply does not speak to the issue central to this case:
The temporary extra “protection” [provided by
the statute] applied to household members who
were not personally involved in the criminal activity, but who may have had knowledge or a reason to know of the drug-related criminal activity.
The statute says nothing about tenants who did
not know, and had no reason to know, of the
criminal activity.
Pet. App. 150a.
3. The only piece of legislative history that speaks directly
to the questions presented is a report from the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs that accom-

15

Section 404 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act was repealed by
the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-144, 103 Stat. 839, 853.
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panied 1990 legislation amending section 1437d(l)(6).16 In
that report, the committee stated that it
anticipates that each case will be judged on its
individual merits and will require the wise exercise of humane judgment by the PHA and the
eviction court. For example, eviction would not
be the appropriate course if the tenant had no
knowledge of the criminal activities of his/her
guests or had taken reasonable steps under the
circumstances to prevent the activity.
S. Rep. No. 101-316 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5763, 5941; see also id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5889 (“[T]he Committee assumes that if the tenant had no
knowledge of the criminal activity or took reasonable steps to
prevent it, then good cause to evict the innocent family members would not exi[s]t.” (discussing similar provision for the
Section 8 program)).17
HUD describes this passage as “merely recogniz[ing] that
PHAs . . . have discretion in deciding whether, if at all, to
evict tenants who have violated the Section 1437d(l)(6) lease
provision, and urg[ing] the importance of a wise use of that
discretion.” HUD Brief 43. But HUD’s characterization is
only half the story. The committee did not merely exhort
PHAs to use their wise discretion. It also stated that the
question whether to evict “require[s] the wise exercise of
humane judgment by the PHA and the eviction court,” and
that eviction courts should exercise their discretion to prevent
16

The legislation was the Cranston-Gonzales National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4185 (1990).

17

HUD attempts to undermine the relevance of the committee report by
arguing that the report discussed a Senate bill different from the one that
was enacted. HUD Brief 43. But the ways in which the Senate bill differed from the final legislation, documented by HUD in its brief, are
wholly irrelevant to the question of Congress’ intent concerning an innocent-tenant defense because the changes relate only to the scope of the
cause for termination. See id. at 43.
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the eviction of innocent tenants. S. Rep. No. 101-316, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5941 (emphasis added). If
the committee did not intend for judges to consider tenants’
claims of reasonable lack of knowledge, then it would make
no sense for it to state that eviction courts should exercise
“humane judgment.” This is because, if tenants do not have
available an innocent-tenant defense, then the only thing for
an eviction court to decide is whether there is a cause for
eviction (e.g., whether the drug-related activity occurred); in
that event, the court would have no occasion to exercise its
“humane judgment.”18
The only legislative history that bears directly on the issue
before the Court demonstrates that Congress intended to
permit tenants to assert innocence as a defense to eviction
under the required lease provision and that HUD’s contrary
interpretation is unreasonable.

18

Indeed, this is HUD’s misguided view of the role of eviction courts.
Screening and Eviction for Drug Abuse and Other Criminal Activity, 66
Fed. Reg. 28776, 28782 (May 24, 2001) (“The statute does not authorize
courts to exercise this same type of discretion. Courts determine whether
a violation of the lease has occurred and whether the lease provides that
such a violation is grounds for eviction of the persons whom the PHA
seeks to evict.”). HUD’s current interpretation is flatly inconsistent with
the committee’s statement that eviction courts will use their discretion in
deciding these public housing eviction cases. Note that this is not how
HUD previously viewed the role of the eviction court. In its notice to
public housing directors explaining President Clinton’s “One Strike and
You’re Out” policy, HUD informed public housing agencies that if they
“do seek eviction” of household members not directly involved with the
drug-related activity, “PHAs should be prepared to persuade a court that
eviction is justified.” HUD, Office of Public and Indian Housing, “One
Strike and You’re Out” Screening and Eviction Guidelines for Public
Housing Authorities, Notice PIH 96-16 (HA), at 8 (April 12, 1996).
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D. Since Congress enacted section 1437d(l)(6) against
a background of state landlord-tenant law in
which there exist affirmative defenses to causes for
termination, had Congress intended to eliminate
such defenses, it would have said so
The Court has explained that where a statute fails to speak
to an issue, deference to agency regulations is appropriate
under Chevron when the issue involved requires the application of the statute’s general policies to specific circumstances. In that case, “the agency must use its discretion to
determine how best to implement the policy in those cases
not covered by the statute's specific terms.” United States v.
Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 393 (1999). However,
this case does not involve a situation in which Congress
could not “anticipate all circumstances in which a general
policy must be given specific effect.” Id. at 392.
In establishing federally-assisted public housing, Congress
created a property interest that is an amalgam of federal and
state law. As HUD has explained,
the procedural and substantive law affecting a
tenancy in the public housing program is compounded of elements established by both Federal
and State law.
State laws are binding without incorporation in
a Federal rule, or in the Federally-required lease
requirements. State tenant protections may be enforced through the State courts or other procedures available under State law, without any need
to create a Federal right to State law protections.
Tenancy and Administrative Grievance Procedure for Public
Housing, 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,257; see also Tenancy and Administrative Grievance Procedure for Public Housing, 56
Fed. Reg. at 51,565 (“The Federal law defines minimum protections for the Federally assisted public housing tenant, but
does not preempt additional protections or rights provided by
the State which do not violate the Federal law.”). When en-
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acting and amending section 1437d(l)(6), Congress was well
aware of the hybrid nature of the public housing leasehold
interest. More specifically, it was aware that public housing
tenants could and routinely do assert state-law defenses to
eviction from public housing. See e.g., supra notes 4, 14.
The distinction between causes for termination of tenancy
and possible defenses to such causes is well established in
landlord-tenant law. See supra Part I. Indeed, various states
have recognized an affirmative innocent-tenant defense to
for-cause evictions. See supra note 9. Congress specifically
chose to require PHAs to use leases that create a specified
cause for termination. Had Congress intended to eliminate a
central element of the public housing tenancy, one would
have expected Congress to have stated so explicitly.19 See
Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986) (“A court may . . .
ask whether the legal question is an important one. Congress
19

HUD itself recognized that Congress intended to leave in place any
state-law defenses to eviction. In announced proposed regulations implementing the 1990 amendments to the predecessor to section
1437d(l)(6), HUD stated that the proposed regulations would have no
federalism implications under Executive Order No. 12,612. Public
Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,575; see
also Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41685, § 4(a) (October 26,
1987) (“Executive departments and agencies shall construe, in regulations
and otherwise, a Federal statute to preempt State law only when the
statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other
firm and palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress
intended preemption of State law, or when the exercise of State authority
directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal
statute.”), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,083, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,615 (May
14, 1998). Similarly, in promulgating its most recent regulations
implementing section 1437d(l)(6), HUD expressly stated that the
regulations do not preempt state law within the meaning of Executive
Order No. 13,132. Screening and Eviction for Drug Abuse and Other
Criminal Activity, 66 Fed. Reg. at 28,791; see also Exec. Order No.
13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, § 4(a) (Aug. 14, 1999) (containing language
substantially similar to Exec. Order No. 12,612 § 4(a)).
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is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major
questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute's daily administration.”); cf.
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(7) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring
that PHAs use leases providing tenants the right to examine
“documents, records, or regulations” directly related to the
PHA’s decision to evict, “notwithstanding any State law” to
the contrary).
This is not a case in which Congress expected HUD to
“fill in the statutory gaps.” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at
150. In light of the hybrid nature of public housing tenancies, Congress’ silence on the viability of affirmative defenses to eviction under the lease provision mandated by section 1437d(l)(6) is an indication of its intent to permit tenants
to continue to avail themselves of all defenses otherwise
available to them as a matter of substantive law, including
that of innocence.
CONCLUSION
The two questions on which the Court granted certiorari
differ in a slight but important respect. The question in No.
00-1770 is whether “the lease clause provided for in 42
U.S.C. [§] 1437d(l)(6) (Sup. V 1999) is violated by drugrelated criminal activity of household members, regardless of
whether it can be shown that the tenant knew, or had reason
to know, of the drug-related activity.” HUD Brief I (emphasis
added). The question in No. 00-1781 is whether “42 U.S.C.
§ 1437d(l)(6) permits termination of a tenancy if a tenant did
not know, or have reason to know, that a household member
or guest engaged in drug-related criminal activity.” OHA
Brief i (emphasis added).
Amici have argued that while section 1437d(l)(6) requires
the use of leases that create a cause for termination when a
household member engages in drug-related criminal activity,
the existence of this cause is fully consistent with the existence of an affirmative innocent-tenant defense to eviction.
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For this reason, Amici urge the Court to answer the question
in No. 00-1770 “Yes, but . . . .” Yes, the lease clause is violated by the drug-related criminal activity of a tenant’s
household members, regardless of the tenant’s knowledge,
but the tenant may assert an innocent-tenant defense at a judicial eviction hearing. For the same reason, Amici urge the
Court to answer the question in No. 00-1781 “No,” because
section 1437d(l)(6) permits public housing tenants to assert
reasonable lack of knowledge as a defense in a judicial eviction proceeding.
Because the judgment of the Court of Appeals is consistent with these answers, it should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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